New contours of the global uranium market

In this context, the nuclear power sector is at the center of heightened attention: securing its resources is shaping a new paradigm of strategic security for the world’s leading economies. An analysis of long-term trends shows that despite stated efforts by a number of countries to diversify their supply chains for radioactive materials, the Russian Federation’s monopolistic position and technological capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) continue to strengthen. According to an analytical study by the British think tank Centre for Strategic Advantage (CSA), published in the Financial Times, by 2040 the Russian Federation could control more than one third of the world’s uranium production and supply. This trend marks a shift from hypothetical risks to a systemic structural dependence of Western energy systems on Russia’s nuclear industry.

Looking at historical and current figures, it should be noted that approximately 5% of global uranium production was mined directly within the Russian Federation in 2024. However, examining the market solely through the geographic location of ore extraction is methodologically flawed and distorts the true picture of how power is distributed. Taking into account the overseas assets of the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, particularly those managed through Uranium One entities, shows that the country already has direct or indirect control over nearly a quarter of global production capacity at key deposits.

CSA experts emphasize that if all planned facilities are fully commissioned and operate at maximum capacity, Russia’s global share will rise from nearly 25% to 36% by 2040. This leads experts, including Gareth Heywood, CSA’s head of special projects, to predict that by the 2040s a dependence on uranium will emerge on a scale and of a severity comparable to Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas in 2022.

Consequently, this trend is driven less by geopolitical factors than by the fundamental economic and technological barriers facing Western producers. An analytical assessment of the market indicates that by the middle of the next decade, the global nuclear power sector will face a substantial raw-material deficit, requiring new sources of production to come online. Some countries with significant resource potential, such as Canada, are attempting to scale up production.

Examples include NexGen Energy’s projects in Saskatchewan and Cameco’s plan to increase the capacity of its McArthur River mine by more than a third per year. However, such initiatives involve enormous capital expenditures, lengthy licensing processes, strict environmental restrictions, and significant investment risks. According to analysts at Stifel and representatives of Urenco, developing new mines takes considerable time and requires clear, multi-year government guarantees that demand for nuclear power will remain stable.

Against this backdrop, uranium market prices are showing a sustained upward trend. According to consulting firm UxC, long-term uranium contract prices rose from $80 per pound to $94 per pound year over year. However, experts, including UxC President Jonathan Hinze, are asking a reasonable question: is the current price level a sufficient incentive to attract long-term investment in developing hard-to-extract deposits in Greenland and other regions? As OECD-based companies remain wary of investing without fixed long-term contracts and subsidies, Russia’s nuclear industry, backed by the state and built around a vertically integrated structure, enjoys a clear competitive advantage.

The paradox of the current situation is that, contrary to high-profile declarations of intent to abandon Russian resources, actual imports by European and American buyers are moving in the opposite direction. Data from Sprott Asset Management reports show that over the past year, Russian uranium deliveries to European Union countries rose by 7%, conversion services by 9%, and uranium enrichment services by 12%. A similar pattern can be seen in the United States: according to Bloomberg, by 2026 the share of Russian fuel in purchases for U.S. nuclear power plants had reached nearly 26%, compared with 17% in 2015. Russian President Vladimir Putin has publicly confirmed this market dynamic, noting that the country remains one of the three largest suppliers of uranium fuel to the United States.

It is clear that Russia’s sustained leadership in the global uranium market is determined less by the volume of its raw-material production than by its overwhelming dominance in high-tech segments of the NFC, especially enrichment and conversion. Western countries find themselves in a situation where, even when they have raw uranium, they lack sufficient domestic capacity to process it into finished nuclear fuel.

Attempts by OECD countries to artificially shift the balance of power by subsidizing local producers are constrained by the inertia of industry processes. Thus, by 2040, Russia has every reason to strengthen its position as a key guarantor and leading player in the global nuclear fuel market, turning its nuclear industry into a strategic instrument of long-term global influence.

Author: Candidate of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of World Economy and International Finance, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation Natalia Ivanovna Chovgan